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Abstract:
The performance of control systems with packet loss as a result of an attack over the actuation
communication channel is analysed. The operator is assumed to monitor the state of the channel by
measuring the average number of packet losses and an attack detection criteria is established based on
the statistic. The performance of the attacker is measured in terms of the increase of the linear quadratic
cost function of the operator subject to a given detection constraint. Within that setting, the optimal denial
of service (DoS) attack strategy is formulated for UDP-like and TCP-like communication protocols. For
both communication protocols, DoS attack constructions that are independent and identically distributed
(IID) are compared to those that are non-stationary. The main contributions of this paper are (i) explicit
characterisation of the expected cost increase of the optimal attack constructions and the associated
packet loss parameter for the IID case, (ii) proof, by example, that non-stationary random attacks
outperform IID attacks in the presence of detection constraints.
Keywords: Secure networked control systems; control and estimation with data loss; control under
communication constraints.
1. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of advanced sensing and communication ca-
pabilities to control systems gives rise to vulnerabilities that can
be exploited with a malicious intent by an attacker (Colbert and
Kott (2016)). While the security challenges that control systems
face are multifaceted and of diverse nature, the simplicity of
implementation of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in field
zones and control zones makes them particularly suitable to
exploit software and hardware faults. In this paper we study
DoS attacks over control systems that experience packet losses
over an actuator communication channel. To account for packet
loss, we consider the two protocols proposed in Schenato et al.
(2007). The first one in which the packet loss is not monitored,
termed UDP-like for its similarity to the communication pro-
tocol. The second protocol is termed as TCP-like and monitors
the packet loss realisation by sending a packet receipt acknowl-
edgement message back to the receiver. Both protocols and the
systems they constitute are depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. In
the literature these are termed like due to previous transmis-
sions being monitored and not retransmitted (Schenato et al.
(2007)), (Sinopoli et al. (2005)), (Sinopoli et al. (2008)), (Mo
et al. (2013)). In Zhang et al. (2016) the authors consider a
deterministic DoS attack strategy on a system with power con-
straints whereas we consider a random DoS attack construction
that operates within a no-detection region using an MPC for-
mulation. We first study attack sequences that are constructed
as an independent and identically distributed (IID) process. The
rationale for this attack construction stems from the simplicity
? This work is supported by Rolls-Royce, ESPRC, and The Control, Monitor-
ing and Systems Engineering UTC at The University of Sheffield.
of the attack implementation and the robust attack performance
for a wide range of system parameters. We then propose a
non-stationary random attack construction and show that for
some systems their dynamics can be exploited by the attacker
to improve upon the IID construction.
2. PLANT MODEL
We consider the plant model given by
Xk+1 =AXk +BVkUk +Wk, (1)
where A ∈Rn×n is the dynamics matrix, Xk ∈Rn describes the
state of the plant at time step k ∈ N, B ∈ Rn×m is the control
matrix, Uk ∈Rm is the vector of control inputs at the k-th time
step, Wk ∈ Rn is the process noise modelled by a Gaussian
distributed vector of random variables with mean 0 ∈ Rn and
covariance matrix ΣW ∈ Sn++ where, Sn++ is the set of n× n
symmetric positive definite matrices, and Vk ∈ Sm+ is the packet
loss variable where the i-th diagonal entry is an IID Bernoulli
random variable with mean µi. We assume that the current state
of the plant is determined by the vector of Gaussian distributed
random variables Xk with mean X ∈Rn and covariance matrix
ΣX ∈ Sn++.
In this paper, we adopt the MPC formulation used in Casbolt
et al. (2019) to describe the plant model in (1) over the predic-
tion horizon N ∈ N+, resulting in the prediction model given
by
χk =ΦXk +Γνkϒk +ΛΞk, (2)
where Φ ∈ RNn×n is the dynamics matrix over the prediction
horizon, χk ∈RNn is the state prediction vector, Γ ∈RNn×Nm is
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Fig. 1. The UDP-like protocol where the realisation of the
packet loss Vk is not monitored
the propagation matrix for the control law over the prediction
horizon, ϒk ∈ RmN is the realisation at the k-th time step of
the control law, Λ ∈ RNn×Nn is the propagation matrix for the
process noise, Ξk ∈RNn is the process noise over the prediction
horizon, and νk is a diagonal matrix with the Bernoulli random
variables describing the packet losses over the prediction hori-
zon along the diagonal. All the terms in (2) are presented in
(6). Due to the lossy communication between the controller and
the plant, the operator implements a communication protocol
to monitor the state of the packets transmitted to the plant. We
adopt the two protocol paradigms proposed by Schenato et al.
(2007), namely a UDP-like protocol that does not monitor the
channel and a TCP-like protocol that acknowledges receipt of
the packet from the controller by sending an acknowledgement
message to the controller over an auxiliary channel. The differ-
ence between both protocol paradigms is depicted in Fig. 1 and
Fig. 2, which show the UDP-like and the TCP-like protocols,
respectively. The information set available to the controller is
determined by the choice of the protocol. We define the infor-
mation sets as
Ik =
Fk =
{
Xk,Vk−1
}
, TCP-like,
Gk =
{
Xk
}
, UDP-like,
(3)
where Vk−1 = {V0,V1, . . . ,Vk−1}, Xk = {X0,X1, . . . ,Xk} and
all sets are monotonically increasing, i.e. there is a filtration
such that Ik ⊆ Ik+1. It is shown in Casbolt et al. (2019) that
for both protocols the optimal control law is determined by
the mean of the packet loss variable ν¯ ∆= E[νk]. Following in
the steps of Schenato et al. (2007), the performance of the
controller is characterised by a linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG)
cost function. The description of the cost function in the MPC
framework proposed in Casbolt et al. (2019) is the cost function
J∗(Ik),min
ϒk
{
E
[
X
T
k QXk +χ
T
k Ωχk +ϒk
Tν
T
k Ψνkϒk
∣∣Ik]},(4)
where Ω ∈ SNn++ is the state penalty diagonal matrix, Ψ ∈ SNm++
is the input penalty diagonal matrix, and the diagonal matrix
Q∈ Sn++. The optimal control law for (4) is obtained in Casbolt
et al. (2019) for each protocol and shown to be
ϒ∗k|Ik=
{
ϒ∗k|Fk=−
(
Ψ+∆Γν
)−1FXk, TCP-like,
ϒ∗k|Gk=−
(
Ψ+∆Γν+
(
I∆Γ)(1−ν))−1FXk,UDP-like,
(5)
where  is the element-wise Hadamard product.
2.1 Attack Model
The performance of the controller is determined by the mean
of the packet losses in the actuation channel. In view of this,
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Fig. 2. The TCP-like protocol where the realisation of the
packet loss Vk is transmitted back to the controller.
we study the security risk posed by an attacker that governs
the statistics of the packet losses on the actuation channel. In
practice, this can be achieved by the attacker via DoS attacks
over the communication channel. We are not concerned with
the particular implementation of the DoS attacks, instead we
study the packet loss attack strategy that aims to disrupt the
operation of the controller. In particular, we consider the case in
which the attacker constructs the attack sequence by designing
a random distribution. The rationale for this stems from the
fact that the operator expects the packet losses to be IID, and
therefore, the attacker mimics the nominal operation of the
channel. That being the case, the optimal attack construction is
characterised by the probability of packet loss in the actuation
channel, described by the diagonal matrix Vαk ∈ Sm++ where the
i-th diagonal entry is an IID Bernoulli random variable with
mean µαi .
To achieve this, the attacker has knowledge of the information
set given by
Ak = {A,B,ΣW , ν¯ ,Ω,Ψ,Ik} . (7)
It is shown later that knowledge of the state of the plant is not
necessary to construct the optimal attack and is only required
to compute the cost induced by the attack for a particular
realisation of the state variables. The controller operates under
the assumption that the packet losses over the actuation channel
are IID with a mean defined by M ∆= E[Vk] for k ∈ N, with
M ∈ Sm++. By changing the statistics of the actuation channel,
the attacker induces a different distribution over the sequence
of packet losses. To distinguish the induced case from the
nominal case the induced sequence of packet losses is defined
as the diagonal matrix Vαk as above. Similarly, the channel is
characterised by Mα ∆=E[Vαk ] for k ∈N, with Mα ∈ Sm++. Note
that the mean does not depend on the time step k, and therefore,
the sequence of random variables describing the packet loss in
the i-th position is IID. The sequence of packet losses over the
prediction horizon is described by the diagonal matrix ναk with
the Bernoulli sequences along the diagonal and ν¯α ,E[ναk ] for
k = 1,2, . . . ,N.
The objective of the attacker, in contrast to the objective of
the controller, is to maximise the cost function (4). The cost
function of the attacker is
JA (Ak), min
ϒ∗k|Ik
{
E
[
XTk QXk +χ
T
k Ωχk +ϒ
T
k ν
αT
k Ψν
α
k ϒk
∣∣Ak]} ,
and the optimal attack construction is defined as
J∗A (Ak),maxν¯α {JA (Ak)} . (8)
Note that, the cost function of the operator in (4) is nested inside
(8), i.e. the attacker chooses the worst case packet loss mean

Xk+1
Xk+2
...
Xk+N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
χk
=

A
A2
...
AN

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ
Xk+

B 0 . . . 0
AB B
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
AN−1B . . . AB B

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ

Vk 0 . . . 0
0 Vk+1
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 . . . 0 Vk+N−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
νk

Unk
Unk+1
...
Unk+N−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϒk
+

I 0 . . . 0
A I
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
AN−1 . . . A I

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ

Wk
Wk+1
...
Wk+N−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξk
(6)
under the assumption that the controller operates optimally. The
state estimation performed by the attacker accounts for the true
statistics of the actuation channel to produce the state prediction
χˆαk
∆
=E
[
χk
∣∣Ak]=ΦXk +Γν¯αϒk, (9)
and the state error prediction of the attack construction for the
two protocols is given by
Eαk|Fk
∆
= χk−E
[
χk
∣∣Fk,ναk ]= ΛΞk, (10a)
Eαk|Gk
∆
= χk−E
[
χk
∣∣Gk]= Γ(ναk − ν¯α)ϒk +ΛΞk, (10b)
for the TCP-like protocol and the UDP-like protocol, respec-
tively. Note that the TCP-like prediction includes the knowl-
edge of ναk , this is the same knowledge the operator has when
calculating this expectation. Specifically, the acknowledgement
link removes the effect of the actuation from the estimation.
Even though at time step k the realisation of Vk+1 is not known,
it is known at time step k+1, and therefore, the operator knows
that any chosen actuation law does not affect the estimation at
future time steps as this contribution can be removed from the
estimation. This is not possible if the acknowledgement channel
is not a perfect channel. The proof of the error trajectories is
analogous to the proof in Casbolt et al. (2019) and is omitted.
We describe the attack induced cost by rewriting (8) in terms of
the state prediction and the state prediction error as in Casbolt
et al. (2019) which yields
J∗A (Ak) =maxν¯α
{
min
ϒ∗k|Ik
{
E
[
XTk QXk +ϒ
T
k ν
αT
k Ψν
α
k ϒk
+(χˆαk +E
α
k )
TΩ(χˆαk +E
α
k )
∣∣∣Ak]}} ,
= XTk
(
Q+∆Φ
)
Xk +max
ν¯α
{
min
ϒ∗k|Ik
{
E
[
EαTk ΩE
α
k
∣∣∣Ak]}
+ϒ∗Tk|Ik ν¯
α
(
2FXk +
(
∆Γν¯α +Ψ
)
ϒ∗k|Ik
)}
, (11)
where ∆Φ =ΦTΩΦ, ∆Γ = ΓTΩΓ, and F= ΓTΩΦ.
2.2 Monitoring of Packet Losses and Attack Detection
The optimal control law for both protocols is determined by
the mean of packet losses as shown in (5). In view of this,
the operator monitors the average number of losses on the
actuation channel to check that it agrees with the postulated
statistic used to construct the control law. Given that the packet
losses form a Bernoulli IID sequence, the distribution is fully
characterised by the mean of packet losses M. To that end, the
system computes the average number of packet losses over each
dimension on the channel up to time step k ∈N thus producing
the estimate for dimension i given by
µˆi,k =
1
k
k
∑
j=1
(V j)i,i, (12)
where (V j)i,i describes the i, i-th element of V j. The resulting
estimate of the mean probability of packet loss at time step k is
given by
M̂k = diag(µˆ1,k, µˆ2,k, . . . , µˆm,k). (13)
The system uses the estimate to check whether the actuation
channel is nominal. In this setting, nominal operation entails
that the estimated mean does not deviate significantly from
the postulated mean used by the controller to implement the
control law. Specifically, the operator determines a safe opera-
tion region shaped as a hypercube centered around M and with
edge lengths determined by L ∈ Sm+, where the structure of the
lengths is such that L = diag(ε1,ε2, . . . ,εm) to account for the
different detection thresholds {εi}mi=1 for each dimension of the
actuation channel. The resulting safe operation region is given
by
C (M,L) =
{
M̂k ∈ [0,1]m×m :−L M̂k−M L
}
. (14)
In this setting, an attack is declared at time step k ∈N if M̂k /∈
C (M,L). Otherwise, normal operation of the system continues
and the operator monitors the packet losses by updating its
estimate M̂k at time step k ∈ N. Note that the operator does
not incorporate a monitoring performance metric in the cost
function; instead, the packet loss monitoring procedure operates
concurrent to the system operation but independently of the
controller. The detection criteria chosen is optimal, the false
alarm rate is determined by L, if the operator decides upon
a time varying Lk instead of a fixed L then instead define
the C (M,L) above as the intersection of all the time varying
regions. In view of this, the attack construction is concerned
with two performance metrics: the cost increase induced by the
attack on the performance of the controller and satisfying that
the calculated average of the packet losses induced by the attack
conforms to the safe region defined by (14). In the following,
we discuss optimal attack construction strategies. It should be
noted that the attacker has access to the variables L and Mk.
3. IID ATTACK CONSTRUCTION
As a result of having access to different information sets, the
UDP-like protocol error trajectory given in (10b) depends on
the mean of the control variable for the attacker, while the
TCP-like protocol does not depend on the mean of the control
variable, as shown in (10a). For that reason, the derivation is
presented separately for the each protocol.
3.1 UDP-like Protocol
The optimal attack strategy for the UDP-like protocol is the
solution to the optimisation problem
max
ν¯α
JA (Ak) (15a)
s.t. Mα ∈ C (M,L) . (15b)
Note that the maximisation aims to increase the cost incurred
by the controller as a result of the packet losses induced by
the attack while the constraint aims to keep the attack within
the safe operation region. Additionally, the maximisation in
(15) and the minimisation of the control law in Casbolt et al.
(2019) differ in that Mα 6=M, and therefore, the terms within
ϒ∗k|Gk described in (5) do not cancel. In the UDP-like setting
the information set, Ak, does not have access to the previous
realisations of packet losses for estimation, that is, Ik = Gk in
(7). Using Lemma 1 from Casbolt et al. (2019) and (11) yields
the equivalent cost function given by
J∗A (Ak) = X
T
k
(
Q+∆Φ
)
Xk + tr
(
∆ΛΣΞ
)
+max
ν¯α
{
ϒ∗Tk|Gk ν¯
α(2FXk
+
(
∆Γν¯α +Ψ+
(
I∆Γ)(I− ν¯α))ϒ∗k|Gk)} , (16)
where ∆Λ = ΛTΩΛ and the maximisation is subject to Mα ∈
C (M,L). In the following, without loss of generality and for
the sake of presentation clarity, it is assumed that all actua-
tors for the system share a single communication channel as
in Schenato et al. (2007). This simplifies the attack construc-
tion while displaying the same properties of the general attack
construction. That being the case, ν¯α is a diagonal matrix with
equal entries, and therefore, ν¯α = αI where α ∈ R is the
control variable of the attacker and αI ∈ C (M,L). Similarly,
the detection region C (M,L) is described, in this case, by the
interval C (µ,ε) where µ ∈ [0,1) is the mean of the Bernoulli
random variable describing the packet losses in the scalar case
and ε ∈ [0,1] denotes the detection threshold set by the operator.
Within this setting, the attack strategy is characterised by the
attack design parameter α . In view of this, substituting α as the
control variable in (16) reduces the optimisation problem to
J∗A (Ak) = X
T
k
(
Q+∆Φ
)
Xk + tr
(
ΣΞ∆Λ
)
+ max
α∈C (µ,ε)
{
ϒTk|Gkα
(
α∆Γ+(1−α)(I∆Γ)+Ψ−2GGk)ϒk|Gk} .
Note that the first two terms on the right hand side of the equa-
tion above are constants that do not depend on α . Therefore, it
is sufficient to maximise the last term. Substituting −G−1Gk FXk
for ϒk|Gk we write the term inside the maximisation as
f (α), XTk FTG−1Gk α
(
α∆Γ+(1−α)(I∆Γ)+Ψ
−2GGk
)
G−1Gk FXk. (17)
The function (17) is concave, convex, or linear in α depending
on the system parameters, and therefore, the attacker has no
control over the convexity of the cost function used for the
attack construction. However, the information set available to
the attacker determines the convexity of the cost function, and
therefore, the attacker is able to construct the optimal attack by
solving (17) for any system parameters. In the following lemma
we show that for the convex and linear systems the optimal
attack construction is equivalent.
Lemma 1. Let (17) be convex or linear in α over C (µ,ε). Then
it’s maximum is given by
max{ f (α)}= max
{
f (min{C (µ,ε)}), f (max{C (µ,ε)})
}
.
Proof. Assume there is a maximum of (17), f (a), such that
a ∈ Int{C (µ,ε)}, we prove by contradiction that this is false,
and therefore, the maximum is on the boundary of C (µ,ε). By
the definition of convexity, for δ > 0 it holds that
f (a)≥max{ f (a+δ ), f (a−δ )}, (18)
f (a)≥ t f (a+δ )+(1− t) f (a−δ ). (19)
It follows that f (a) is greater than any point of the line con-
necting f (a+ δ ) and f (a− δ )) however, this breaks the con-
vexity assumption of (17), and therefore, the maximum is on
the boundary. This concludes the proof. 
When the function is concave there is a third maximising pos-
sibility, the case for which the global maximum of the function
exists within the interval C (µ,ε). The following lemma de-
scribes this case.
Lemma 2. Let (17) be concave in α over C (µ,ε). Then the
maximum of the function is given by
max{ f (α)}=max
{
f (min{C (µ,ε)}),
f (max{C (µ,ε)}), f (1C (µ,ε) (αmax)αmax)} , (20)
where 1B (αmax) is the indicator function as a function of αmax
over the setB and αmax ∈R is the global maximum of f (α).
Proof. In the concave case a global maximum exists, but
is not necessarily within the interval C (µ,ε), and therefore,
we restrict the domain to the safe operation region with the
indicator function 1C (µ,ε) (α). The concavity of the function
implies
f ′(α) = ϒ∗Tk|Gk
(
2α∆Γ+(1−2α)(I∆Γ)+Ψ−2GGk)ϒ∗k|Gk,(21)
f ′′(α) = 2ϒ∗Tk|Gk
(
∆Γ− (I∆Γ))ϒ∗k|Gk < 0, (22)
where (22) follows from the strict concavity of (17). Setting
(21) equal to zero gives
ϒ∗Tk|Gk
(
2α∆Γ+(1−2α)(I∆Γ)+Ψ−2GGk)ϒ∗k|Gk = 0,
which results in
2αXTk F
TG−1Gk
(
∆Γ− (I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk =
XTk F
TG−1Gk
(
2GGk −Ψ−
(
I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk. (23)
It follows from the strict concavity of (17), as in (22), that
XTk F
TG−1Gk
(
∆Γ− (I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk 6= 0. (24)
In view of this (23) can be solved for α yielding
αmax =
1
2
h−1UDP
(
XTk F
TG−1Gk
(
2GGk −Ψ−
(
I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk) , (25)
where hUDP
∆
= ϒ∗Tk|Gk
(
∆Γ− (I∆Γ))ϒ∗k|Gk . The global max-
imum is the solution when αmax ∈ C (µ,ε), i.e. the term
αmax1C (µ,ε) (αmax) in (20). When αmax /∈ C (µ,ε) the solu-
tion follows as in the convex scenario by noticing that the
inequality is strict and in the opposite direction. Therefore,
if αmax /∈ C (µ,ε) the attack construction reverts to selecting
the value of α on the maximising boundary. For a concave
function this is equivalent to finding the boundary that is closest
to αmax. Let a,b ∈ C (µ,ε) and assume f (a) > f (b) and that
|a−αmax|< |b−αmax|, then
f (b)< t f (a)+(1− t) f (αmax). (26)
However, this line segment lies above the function which con-
tradicts the fact that this function is concave, and therefore, the
maximising α is on the boundary that is closest to αmax. This
concludes the proof. 
Note that the αmax attack construction provides a globally
optimal performance for the attacker from within the safe
operation region. In fact, it also provides a lower probability of
attack detection as it allows the attacker to operate away from
the boundary.
The following lemma highlights that an attack that minimises
the cost of the operator is not achieved by setting α = 1. In the
following we show that the optimal attack construction does
not necessarily imply increasing the number of packet losses
incurred by the operator. Indeed, there exist system parameters
for which the optimal attack entails increasing the number
of actuations. Whilst this might not be implementable in all
attack scenarios, it is feasible to envision settings in which the
attacker has full control of the actuation channel and can set
the packet loss statistics at will. The following lemma captures
this notion, namely, that the performance of the operator does
not necessarily improve with the average number of received
packets. Reiterating that the operator assumes a mean packet
loss, and in doing so, creates an opportunity for the attacker to
exploit the channel.
Lemma 3. For any choice of system parameters it holds that
min
a∈[0,1)
f (a)≤min{ f (1), f (µ)} , (27)
where f is defined in (17).
Proof. Setting (21) equal to zero, and substituting in α = 1
yields
f ′(1) = ϒ∗Tk|Gk
(
2(I− ν¯)∆Γ−Ψ− (3I−2ν¯)(I∆Γ))ϒ∗k|Gk .
For this to be a minimising solution it needs to hold that, Ψ
is equal to 2(I− ν¯)∆Γ− (3I−2ν¯)(I∆Γ). Due to Ψ being a
diagonal matrix and the structure of ∆Γ it is only possible for
this equality to hold in a system with A = 0 and a diagonal B.
In this scenario, ∆Γ =
(
I∆Γ), this results in, Ψ=−(I∆Γ).
By assumption Ψ  0, however, it is shown in Lemma 5 that(
I∆Γ)  0 which is a contradiction, and therefore, f ′(α =
1) 6= 0 and thus α = 1 is not a minimising solution. Substituting
αI= µI= ν¯ in (21) results in
f ′(α) = ϒ∗Tk|Gk
(
2ν¯∆Γ+(I−2ν¯)(I∆Γ)+Ψ−2GGk)ϒ∗k|Gk ,
=−XTk FTG−1Gk
(
Ψ+
(
I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk. (28)
This is not equal to 0 due toΨ+
(
I∆Γ) 0. Therefore, (28) is
strictly negative and not a minimising solution. This concludes
the proof. 
Theorem 4. Let Ak = {A,B,ΣW , ν¯ ,Ω,Ψ,Gk} be the informa-
tion set available to construct the attack, then the optimal mean
packet loss probability for an IID attack is given by
α∗UDP =max
{
f (min{C (µ,ε)}) , f (max{C (µ,ε)}) ,
f
(
1C (µ,ε) (αmax)αmax
)}
,
where
f (a), XTk FTG−1Gk a
(
a∆Γ+(1−a)(I∆Γ)+Ψ
−2GGk
)
G−1Gk FXk.
Proof. The result follows from the application of Lemma 1 for
the convex and linear cases, Lemma 2 for the concave case, and
by noticing that the set of solutions for the convex and linear
cases is a subset of of the set of solutions of the concave case.
This concludes the proof. 
3.2 TCP-like Protocol
The optimal attack strategy for the TCP-like protocol is the
solution to the optimisation problem
max
ν¯α
JA (Ak) , (29a)
s.t. Mα ∈ C (M,L) . (29b)
Note that in this case the information set Ak contains the re-
alisations of the packet losses as given in Fk. For that reason,
the optimisation problem differs from that in (15) in that the
cost function exhibits a different structure induced by the con-
ditioning of the previous packet loss realisations. From (11)
and Lemma 1 in Casbolt et al. (2019) with substitution of the
optimal control law under the TCP-like protocol in (5) yields
J∗(Ak) = XTk
(
Q+∆Φ
)
Xk + tr
(
∆ΛΣΞ
)
+max
ν¯α
{
XTk F
TG−1Fk ν¯
α (∆Γν¯α +Ψ−2GFk)G−1FkFXk}, (30)
where the maximisation is subject to Mα ∈ C (M,L). As
with the UDP-like protocol attack construction, it is assumed
without loss of generality, that all actuators share a single
communication channel (Schenato et al. (2007)). Therefore,
ν¯α = αI. Noting that the first two terms in (30) do not depend
on ν¯α and that GFk =
(
∆Γν¯+Ψ
)
as shown in (Casbolt et al.
(2019)), then the term inside the maximisation can be rewritten
as
g(α),−XTk FTG−1Fkα
(
∆Γ (2ν¯−αI)+Ψ)G−1FkFXk. (31)
Differentiating (31) results in
g′ (α) =−XTk FTG−1Fk
(
∆Γ (2ν¯−2αI)+Ψ)G−1FkFXk, (32)
g′′ (α) = 2XTk F
TG−1Fk∆
ΓG−1FkFXk. (33)
Lemma 5. Let the pair (A,B) be reachable and the state penalty
matrix Ω be positive definite. Then the function defined by (31)
is convex in α over C (µ,ε) almost surely.
Proof. It follows from (33) that if ∆Γ  0 and Xk 6= 0 then
(33) is strictly greater than zero. Therefore, (31) is convex in
α over C (µ,ε). It is shown in (Seber, 2007, p.225, 10.31(c))
that when rank(Γ) = max{Nn,Nm} and Ω is positive def-
inite then ∆Γ  0. Since (A,B) is a reachable pair then
rank
[
B,AB, . . . ,AN−1B
]
= max{n,m}. Therefore, due to the
triangular structure of Γwe have that rank(Γ) =max{Nn,Nm}.
Under these assumptions (33) is convex in α over C (µ,ε)
when Xk 6= 0, which holds with probability 1. This concludes
the proof. 
Theorem 6. Consider a system operating with a TCP-like pro-
tocol.
g(α),−XTk FTG−1Fkα
(
∆Γ (2ν¯−αI)+Ψ)G−1FkFXk,
Therefore, the optimal choice of α is
α∗TCP = max
{
g(min{C (µ,ε)}) ,g(max{C (µ,ε)})
}
.
Proof. Note from Lemma 5 that g(α) is convex therefore, as
shown in Lemma 3, α∗TCP is known to be on the boundary. This
concludes the proof.
Note that due to the convexity of (31) the solution of (32) results
in the minimising value of α , which interestingly is not αI= ν¯ ,
or α = 1 but instead is given by
αmin =
1
2
h−1TCP
(
XTk F
TG−1Gk
(
2∆Γν¯+Ψ
)
G−1Gk FXk
)
, (34)
where hTCP = XTk F
TG−1Fk∆
ΓG−1FkFXk > 0. When considering
the TCP-like protocol without detection constraints, additional
insight can be obtained by analysing the attack construction
g(1) = XTk F
TG−1Fk
(
∆Γ (I−2ν¯)−Ψ)G−1FkFXk, g(0) = 0.(35)
From (35), if ∆Γ (I−2ν¯)  Ψ the maximising value of α is
1 or 0. The ∆Γ (I−2ν¯) term is the state penalty matrix Ω
weighted by the reachability of the system and the packet
loss probability. The terms in (35) capture the average impact
of actuation in the cost reduction with respect to the input
penalty matrix Ψ. Therefore, the optimal attack is 1 when the
average cost increase per actuation is greater than the average
penalty induced by the actuation. As a result, for a system
with a high probability of packet loss that penalises state error
more than actuation, the optimal attack strategy is to allow
perfect communication, i.e. all packets are received by the
plant. Additionally, for ν¯  12 I the optimal attack strategy is
ν¯ = 0. That being the case, for a system with a low probability
of packet losses the operator could simplify their detection
criteria to a one-sided test.
4. COST INCREASE ANALYSIS
In this section we evaluate the cost increase induced by the
optimal IID attack by comparing the expected cost when an
attack is present to the expected cost when no attack is present,
i.e. E [J∗A(Ak)] − E [J∗(Ik)]. The expected cost increase of
the three attack strategies are studied separately. The analysis
is carried out for the case C (µ,ε) = [0,1), i.e. the extreme
cases of the average attack packet drop. Note that there is no
loss of generality as the case with detection constraints can
be analysed following the same approach with the appropriate
scaling. Additionally, when considering the different cases of
α∗ it should be noted that for a given set of detection parameters
α∗ is unique. Since, the detection parameters, µ,ε , are not
fixed. The region [0,1) is continuous with respect to α∗.
4.1 UDP-like Cost Analysis
Attack performance when α∗→ 0. We first analyse the case
when the attacker losses all the packets and induces the cost
E
[
J0A(Ak)
] ∆
= lim
α∗→0
E [JA(Ak)] . (36)
The expected cost when there is an attack is given by
E
[
J0A(Ak)
]
= tr
(
ΣX
(
Q+∆Φ
)
+ΣΞ∆Λ
)
+max{ f (α)}. (37)
Since (17) is continuous in α we have that α∗ → 0 implies
f (α∗)→ 0, and therefore, the cost increase is
E
[
J0A(Ak)
]−E [J∗(Gk)] = XTk FTG−1Gk ν¯FXk > 0. (38)
Note that the α∗→ 0 attack strategy forces the system into open
loop, and therefore, the expected cost increase coincides with
the expected cost reduction introduced by the controller when
there is no attack present in the communication channel.
Attack performance when α∗ = 1. In this case, the attacker
allows successful reception of all packets, i.e. the actuation
communication channel is perfect. Surprisingly, there exist
systems for which the cost increase, given by
E
[
J1A(Ak)
] ∆
= E [JA(Ak)]
∣∣∣
α∗=1
, (39)
is positive despite the fact that the communication channel of
the operator improves. Evaluation of (17) with perfect commu-
nication results in
E
[
J1(Ak)
]
= tr
(
ΣX
(
Q+∆Φ
)
+ΣΞ∆Λ
)
+XTk F
TG−1Gk (I−2ν¯)
(
∆Γ− (I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk
−XTk FTG−1Gk
((
I∆Γ)+Ψ)G−1Gk FXk. (40)
Unlike the α∗ → 0 case, the α∗ = 1 construction does not
guarantee an increase in cost for every system. In fact, the cost
only increases when
XTk F
TG−1Gk (I−2ν¯)
(
∆Γ− (I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk ≥
XTk F
TG−1Gk
((
I∆Γ)+Ψ)G−1Gk FXk > 0. (41)
However, all variables that determine (41) are system parame-
ters known by the attacker, and therefore, the attacker decides
the optimal attack strategy accordingly. The expected cost in-
crease is
E
[
J1A(Ak)
]−E [J∗(Gk)]
= XTk F
TG−1Gk
(
∆Γ+Ψ
)
G−1Gk FXk +(ν¯−2I)X
T
k F
TG−1Gk FXk.
Attacker performance when α∗ = 1C (µ,ε) (αmax)αmax. We
tackle next the introduction of a general detection constraint.
In this case, the expected cost for the attacker is
E [Jαmax(Ak)]
∆
=E [JA(Ak)]
∣∣∣
α∗=αmax
= tr
(
ΣX
(
Q+∆Φ
)
+ΣΞ∆Λ
)
+ f (αmax).
Algebraic maniupulation of f (αmax) and substituting (25)
yields:
f (αmax)=
h−1UDP
4
(
XTk F
TG−1Gk
(
2GGk −Ψ−
(
I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk)2,
where the inequality comes from the fact that f is concave when
αmax is a feasible optimal attack strategy. The resulting cost
increase is
E [Jαmax (Ak)]− J∗(Gk) = XTk FTG−1Gk ν¯FXk
+
1
4
h−1UDP
(
XTk F
TG−1Gk
(
2GGk −Ψ−
(
I∆Γ))G−1Gk FXk)2 > 0.
Note that the inequality is strict, i.e. the attack guarantees a
performance loss of the operator. As mentioned previously
this attack strategy is only feasible when αmax ∈ C (µ,ε) and
(17) is concave. Additionally, E
[
J0 (Ak)
]− E [J∗ (Gk)] is a
upper bounded by the cost increase induced by the α∗ =
1C (µ,ε) (αmax)αmax strategy.
4.2 TCP-like Cost Analysis
The cost increase analysis for TCP-like protocols contains only
two attack strategies. The analysis is again performed on the
C (µ,ε) = [0,1) interval.
Attacker performance when α∗→ 0. For the attack construc-
tion that forces the system into open loop the expected cost is
given by
E
[
J0 (Ak)
]
= tr
(
ΣX
(
Q+∆Φ
)
+ΣΞ∆Λ
)
+ lim
α∗→0
g(α∗).
Since (35) is continuous in α we have that α∗ → 0 implies
g(α∗)→ 0. Therefore, the expected cost increase is:
E
[
J0 (Ak)
]−E [J∗ (Fk)] = XTk FTG−1Fk ν¯FXk > 0.
As with the UDP-like protocol, by implementing the α∗ → 0
attack strategy the attacker forces the system into open loop.
Note that the cost increase for the TCP-like protocol and
the UDP-like protocol under the α∗ → 0 strategy differ only
in the GIk designed by the controller, i.e. on the available
information.
Attacker performance when α∗ = 1. In the TCP case, the
attack that provides a perfect communication channel induces
an expected cost given by
E
[
J1 (Ak)
]
= tr
(
ΣX
(
Q+∆Φ
)
+ΣΞ∆Λ
)
+g(1).
Therefore, it follows form (35) that the expected cost increase
induced by the α∗ = 1 strategy is
E
[
J1 (Ak)
]−E [J∗ (Fk)]
= XTk F
TG−1Fk
(
∆Γ (I−2ν¯)−Ψ)G−1FkFXk︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+XTk F
TG−1Fk ν¯FXk︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[J0(Ak)]−E[J∗(Fk)]
,
where the first term is strictly positive following the assumption
that the α∗ = 1 attack construction is optimal. Therefore, α∗=
1 is strictly greater than the α∗→ 0 attack strategy only when
∆Γ (I−2ν¯)Ψ, which is the condition needed for the α∗ = 1
construction to be optimal.
5. NON-STATIONARY RANDOM ATTACKS
Since the plant given in (1) is Markovian, it seems reasonable to
assume that the attacker should be able to exploit the memory
of the system in the construction of the attack. In that sense,
the IID attack construction does not provide sufficient flexi-
bility to incorporate the time dependency between consecutive
packet losses. Motivated by this insight, in the following we
investigate the extension of random attacks to non-IID settings.
Specifically, we consider the case in which the statistics of the
attack are non-stationary. The resulting non-stationary attack
construction extends the IID attack construction to an attack
that corrupts a system with independent actuator channels. As
in the IID case, the aim of the attacker is to increase the cost
function while remaining in the safe operation region by ad-
justing the value of Mα . Additionally, the attack construction
is no longer restricted to a constant Mα , i.e. Mαk
∆
= E[Vαk ] for
k ∈N. The derivation of the non-stationary attack construction
is equivalent to the IID attack construction up to (16). The
reason for the necessity of a different derivation stems from the
fact that ν¯α 6= αI since Mαk 6=Mαk+1 for k ∈N.
We first consider the non-stationary attack construction for the
UDP-like protocol. Notice that for the non-stationary construc-
tion maximising (16) is equivalent to is equivalent to maximis-
ing the function
f (ν¯α) =ϒ∗TGk ν¯
α(∆Γν¯α +Ψ+ (I∆Γ)(I− ν¯α) −2GGk)ϒ∗Gk ,
= tr
(
ν¯α
((
∆Γ−(I∆Γ))ν¯α + (I∆Γ)+Ψ−2GGk)ϒ∗Gkϒ∗TGk ) ,
where the maximisation is subject to Mαk ∈C (M,L) for k ∈N.
Letting ∆H = ∆Γ− (I∆Γ), and substituting GGk allows the
optimal attack strategy for the UDP-like protocol to be posed
as a quadratic optimisation problem (QP) given by
max
ν¯α
tr
([
ν¯α∆H ν¯α − ν¯α ((I∆Γ)+Ψ+2ν¯∆H)]ϒ∗Gkϒ∗TGk ) ,
s.t. Mαk ∈ C (M,L) for k ∈N. (42)
Note that the set of IID attack strategies is a subset of the
strategies generated with this formulation. Therefore, if IID
is indeed the optimal attack then the proposed non-stationary
attack construction coincides with the strategy presented in
the previous section. If however, the cost induced by the non-
stationary attack is greater than that induced by αI, then it
follows that memory in the attack yields larger cost increases
while satisfying the same detection constraints. Performing the
same analysis for the TCP-like system results in an analogous
QP formulation given by
max
ν¯α
tr
([
ν¯α∆Γν¯α − ν¯α (2ν¯∆Γ+Ψ)]ϒ∗Fkϒ∗TFk) ,
s.t. Mαk ∈ C (M,L) for k ∈N. (43)
In the TCP-like scenario the terms ∆Γ, Ψ, and ϒ∗Fkϒ
∗T
Fk
are
positive semidefinite. Both UDP-like and TCP-like QP formu-
lations can be modified to include IID attacks on non-scalar
systems provided that the additional constraint Mαk =M
α
k+1 for
k ∈N is included.
6. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The comparison between the IID attack and the non-stationary
attack is conducted over two communication channels for the
same system. To that end, we use the same test system as
in Casbolt et al. (2019). The first simulation is performed over
a scalar communication channel with M = 0.7 by averaging
1000 realisations of the state trajectories and is shown in Fig. 3
and 4. Additionally, when under attack the UDP-like system
trajectory depicted in Fig. 4 displays a larger change from
the nominal state trajectory when compared with TCP-like
trajectory depicted in Fig. 3. For the second channel model,
i.e. M =
(
0.7 0
0 0.01
)
, the non-stationary attack results in a larger
increase from the nominal state trajectory when compared to
the IID attack as shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, which are obtained
by averaging 1000 realisations of the state trajectories. As in
the previous case, the results suggest that the system operating
with a UDP-like protocol is more vulnerable to attacks than
a system operating with a TCP-like protocol. The nominal
terminal cost of the system with no attack present is 7.671
for the UDP-like protocol shown in Fig. 6. Interestingly, the
terminal cost induced by the non-stationary attack is 18.217
while the terminal cost induced by the IID attack is 13.26.
This suggests that UDP-like protocols are more vulnerable
to non-stationary attacks than to IID attacks. However, the
difference in the induced cost for the scalar channel shown
in Fig. 4 is not as significant as that for the multiple input
channel. Surprisingly, for the TCP-like case shown in Fig.
5 the performance of the IID attack outperforms the non-
stationary attack. Specifically, the terminal cost induced by the
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Fig. 3. System with TCP-like protocol with A =
(
1.03 0.005
0.35 0.5
)
,
M= 0.7, and ε = 0.1.
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Fig. 4. System with UDP-like protocol with A =
(
1.03 0.005
0.35 0.5
)
,
M= 0.7, and ε = 0.1.
IID attack is 8.689 whereas the terminal cost induced by the
non-stationary attack is 8.525. This small difference is due to
numerical error in the simulations, indeed when the accuracy
is increased the non-stationary cost converges to the IID attack
cost. These results seem to suggest that there is no significant
advantage in implementing non-stationary attacks in TCP-like
systems.
7. CONCLUSION AND COMPARISON
We have characterised the optimal IID attack construction for
UDP-like and TCP-like systems with lossy actuation channels.
The attacks are envisioned as DoS attacks over the actuation
communication channel which results in packet losses being
induced by the attacker. Under the assumption that the opera-
tor monitors the state of the channel with the average packet
loss as the decision statistic, we have shown that the opti-
mal attack strategy does not always increase the number of
packet losses. In fact, we have characterised the effect of the
system parameters over the solution structure and shown that
three different scenarios emerge for which the attack strategy is
different. Interestingly, under both protocols the attacker only
needs to know ∆Γ, Ψ, and M to decide the optimal strategy,
unless the system operates with a UDP-like protocol and the
function is concave, in which case all system parameters must
be known. For all cases, the cost increase of the optimal IID
construction has been characterised and analysed. We have
also shown that the IID attack construction is not optimal by
proposing an achievability scheme that constructs attacks with
non-stationary statistics. It is shown numerically that the pro-
posed non-stationary attack outperforms the IID attack in most
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Fig. 5. System with TCP-like protocol with A =
(
1.03 0.005
0.35 0.5
)
,
M=
(
0.7 0
0 0.01
)
, and L= 0.1I.
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Fig. 6. System with UDP-like protocol with A =
(
1.03 0.005
0.35 0.5
)
,
M=
(
0.7 0
0 0.01
)
, and L= 0.1I.
settings although at the expense of increased computational
complexity.
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